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In an article appeared in the Journal of Mathematical Economics, J. Geanakoplos
and H. Polemarchakis, [Geanakoplos J. and Polemarchakis H.M.: \Pareto improving
taxes", Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008), 682{696], prove on page 685
the following theorem:
\Theorem. For almost all economies with separable externalities and L > I, every
competitive equilibrium is constrained Pareto suboptimal, that is, for each competitive
equilibrium, there exists an anonymous tax package t and a competitive t-equilibrium
allocation which Pareto dominates it."
It is the purpose of this comment to show that restrictions must be applied on the
limiting cases for the theorem to hold. Proposition 1.3, below, gives a counter-positive
result and the ensuing Corollary shows that the Theorem in [Geanakoplos & Polemar-
chakis 2008][p. 685] does not hold for I = 2 and subsequently the example given in
Section 6, page 693, of [Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (2008)] appears to be incorrect.
We keep the notation as in [Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (2008)]. First, a
lemma
Lemma 1.1 In a pure exchange economy with separable externalities where each com-
modity is traded (bought or sold) in equal amounts the revenue generated by an anony-
mous tax package can be compensated by a respective adjustment of prices.
Proof. We shall prove the lemma in a commodity-wise manner, i.e. we claim that the
tax revenue raised by the trade of a commodity that is purchased and sold in equal
amounts can be completely absorbed by a readjustment of the price of the commodity.
This is trivially true for a commodity that is not traded at all.
Let B
j
the set of 
j
:= #(B
j
) consumers buying commodity j in equal amounts,
say q
b
j
, and S
j
the set of 
j
:= #(S
j
) consumers selling commodity j in equal amounts,
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say q
s
j
. A consumer either sells q
s
j
units of commodity j or buys q
b
j
units of commodity
j, i.e. 
j
+ 
j
= I. If a is a vector of R
I
, let us denote by a^
j
the vector of R
I
dened
by
(a^
j
)
i
:=
(
a
i
; i 6= j
0 ; i = j
:
The per capita share of total tax revenue due to the trade of commodity j is

j
=
1
I
X
b2B
j
t
j
(x
s
j
  e
s
j
) =
1
I

j
t
j
q
b
j
:
We may, therefore, write the total per capita tax revenue as composed of two parts
one part due to the trade of commodity j, 
j
, and another part raised through the
trade of other than j commodities,
 =
1
I

j
t
j
q
b
j
+
1
I
I
X
i=1
^
t
j
 (x^
i
j
  e^
i
j
)
+
:(1-1)
We look at the budget constraint of all consumers distinguishing between the two
mutually exclusive groups of buyers and sellers of commodity j. Let i
b
j
and i
s
j
denote
a typical buyer and a typical seller of commodity j, respectively.
The income constraint of buyer i
b
j
is
(p+ t)  (x
i
b
j
  e
i
b
j
)
+
  p  (x
i
b
j
  e
i
b
j
)
 
 
(p
j
+ t
j
)(x
i
b
j
j
  e
i
b
j
j
) + (p^
j
+
^
t
j
)  (x^
i
b
j
j
  e^
i
b
j
j
)
+
  p  (x
i
b
j
  e
i
b
j
)
 
  :(1-2)
Taking into account 1-1 and the fact that x
i
b
j
j
  e
i
b
j
j
= q
b
j
, inequality 1-2 becomes
(p
j
+ (1  

j
I
)t
j
)(x
i
b
j
j
  e
i
b
j
j
) + (p^
j
+
^
t
j
)  (x^
i
b
j
j
  e^
i
b
j
j
)
+
(1-3)
 p  (x
i
b
j
  e
i
b
j
)
 

1
I
I
X
i=1
^
t
j
 (x^
i
j
  e^
i
j
)
+
:
The corresponding constraint of the random seller i
s
j
of commodity j is
(p + t)(x
i
s
j
  e
i
s
j
)
+
  p
j
(x
i
s
j
j
  e
i
s
j
j
)
 
  p^
j
 (x^
i
s
j
j
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i
s
j
j
)
 
(1-4)
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+
:
However, 
j
q
b
j
= 
j
q
s
j
by assumption and 1-4 becomes
(p + t)(x
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j
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j
j
)
 
  p^
j
 (x^
i
s
j
j
  e^
i
s
j
j
)
 

1
I

j
t
j
q
s
j
+
1
I
I
X
i=1
^
t
j
 (x^
i
j
  e^
i
j
)
+
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which together with the fact that (x
i
s
j
j
  e
i
s
j
j
)
 
= q
s
j
yields
(p+ t)(x
i
s
j
  e
i
s
j
)
+
  (p
j
+

j
I
)(x
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s
j
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i
s
j
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i
j
)
+
:
completing the proof since

j
I
= 1 

j
I
.
Remark 1.2 A converse to the statement of Lemma 1.1 may be proved provided that
the optimum is attained on the boundary.
Proposition 1.3 In a pure exchange economy with full trade and separable exter-
nalities if all commodities are sold and bought in equal amounts, no anonymous tax
package can Pareto improve a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. According to Lemma 1.1, the extra income generated by the redistribution
of taxes collected by application of any tax package can be completely absorbed by
a corresponding change in the price each commodity is traded leading to no better
reallocation of the initial resources.
Corollary 1.4 In a pure exchange economy of two consumers and L commodities,
with separable externalities, no anonymous tax package can Pareto improve a compet-
itive equilibrium.
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